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French law allows organ donation after death due to cardiocirculatory arrest. In the Maastricht classification, type III
non-heart-beating donors are those who experience cardiocirculatory arrest after the withdrawal of life-sustaining
treatments. French authorities in charge of regulating organ donation (Agence de la Biomédecine, ABM) are
considering organ collection from Maastricht type III donors. We describe a scenario for Maastricht type III organ
donation that fully complies with the ethical norms governing care to dying patients. That organ donation may
occur after death should have no impact on the care given to the patient and family. The dead-donor rule must be
followed scrupulously: the organ retrieval procedure must neither cause nor hasten death. The decision to
withdraw life-sustaining treatments, withdrawal modalities, and care provided to the patient and family must
adhere strictly to the requirements set forth in patient-rights legislation (the 2005 Léonetti law in France) and
should not be influenced in any way by the possibility of organ donation. A major ethical issue regarding the
family is how best to transition from discussing treatment-withdrawal decisions to discussing possible organ
retrieval for donation should the patient die rapidly after treatment withdrawal. Close cooperation between the
healthcare team and the organ retrieval team is crucial to minimize the distress of family members during this
transition. Modalities for implementing Maastricht type III organ donation are discussed here, including the best
location for withdrawing life-sustaining treatments (operating room or intensive care unit).
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Principles
All procedures performed in the intensive care unit (ICU),
regardless of the final outcome, are performed on and for a
human being who has inherent and inalienable rights, re-
gardless of his or her medical condition [1]. Compliance
with the ethical requirements ensuring that these rights are
respected underpins and legitimizes the technical health-
care procedures. Consequently, no technical requirements,* Correspondence: didier.dreyfuss@lmr.aphp.fr
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in any medium, provided the original work is phowever legitimate, can override the ethical requirements,
failing which the patient would be a mere object to be used
for a strictly technical activity devoid of humanity. These
ethical requirements govern the activity of intensivists by
framing their goal and mission, which consist in saving lives
whenever possible and, otherwise, in providing continuous
care until death occurs, under the best possible conditions.
The goal and mission of organ retrieval teams are no less
legitimate but differ from those of intensivists. Organ re-
trieval teams seek either to save the life of a person who will
possibly, probably, or certainly die without organ trans-
plantation or to improve the quality of life of a person who
has a chronic disorder. The technical procedures needed tois an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
g/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction
roperly cited.
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requirements, including those dealing with the body of the
donor (i.e., the obligation to perform reconstructive proce-
dures that restore the human appearance of the body).
What is a Maastricht type III donor?
In Maastricht type III donation [2] (also known as con-
trolled donation after circulatory determination of death
[DCDD]), cardiocirculatory arrest is awaited, as it results
from the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatments. In this
situation, cardiocirculatory arrest is not induced but is
expected to occur, in a patient for whom no effective treat-
ment options are available and as a result of a treatment-
withdrawal decision made in agreement with advance
directives (if available), the family, and the healthcare team.
The occurrence of cardiocirculatory arrest shortly after
treatment withdrawal may allow the collection of organs
for transplantation (only the liver, kidneys [and cornea] are
considered for collection in Maastricht type III donation
by French regulatory authorities).
Providing continuous end-of-life care takes precedence
over organ retrieval
The withdrawal of treatments that have become useless,
disproportionate, and unreasonable and whose only effect
is to maintain life artificially should be performed in ac-
cordance with French law (the Léonetti law [3]): treatment
withdrawal is not performed with the goal of allowing
Maastricht type III donation. Treatment withdrawal aims
to allow death to occur, that is, to avoid prolongation of
the dying process by interventions that are useless, costly,
and possibly degrading. The treatment-withdrawal decision
can only be fully legitimate when placed in the clinical con-
text, which is unique to each patient. As long as the patient
is alive, he or she cannot be viewed as a potential reservoir
of organs or other materials that could be put to use, fail-
ing which the patient would be robbed of his or her death
and considered, not as a finality, but as a means put pre-
maturely to use by others.
Giving priority to the desire to save lives via organ re-
trieval by instrumentalizing a dying patient at the expense
of providing care and ensuring dignity throughout the
dying process, as set forth in the Léonetti law, is ethically
unacceptable. The issue of the precedence of one reason
for acting (to save lives) over another (to provide continu-
ous care to patients) raises the issue of the status of the in-
dividual. Lives in this case are perceived as able to replace
one another, instead of biographic experiences that are
unique to each individual. This position that views the
human being from a utilitarian perspective, perhaps even
as an instrument, converts the broad scope of life, which
encompasses the dying process, to narrowly organic con-
siderations. It may seem to be justified by the current se-
vere shortage of organs, which causes considerable harmto patients who experience increasing ill health or who die
because no transplant is available, as well as to the organ
retrieval team, for whom the well-being and survival of
transplant-list patients are crucial objectives. The argu-
ment that organ retrieval is justified because transplant-
able organs are in short supply suggests that these organs,
and the lives they save, may have value independently
from the person who donated the organs, as if one had a
body instead of being a body.
For the ICU team, reasoning in terms of “potential
organ donation” and, to an even greater extent, of “ne-
cessary preparations” before the end of the sequence of
patient care required by treatment withdrawal contra-
dicts ethical, psychological, and human principles in a
way that is untenable. This contradiction must not be
overlooked. Such a change in the paradigm of care dur-
ing a sequence defined by its goal, unity, and cohesion
would generate severe or even unbearable tensions
among the healthcare team (physicians and other health-
care professionals), as well as mistrust and suspicion re-
sponsible for overwhelming anxiety among the family
members and friends of the patient. This relinquishing
of the principles of beneficence and nonmaleficence [4]
to support a reckless view of the sole distributive justice
principle would harm the dying patient and the family
and also might adversely affect the alleged goal, namely,
organ retrieval. Even the tiniest deviation from ethical
principles during organ retrieval after cardiac arrest (e.g.,
hastening of ineludible cardiac arrest with the goal of
ensuring optimal organ retrieval) would—and rightly
so—attract the attention of the media and cause legitim-
ate outrage among the general public. Any situation that
is handled as justifying instrumentalization of the patient
(beyond the unique features of the individual case gener-
ating the emotional reaction) would probably be coun-
terproductive, not only for non-heart-beating donation
but also for donation after brain death. No one would
benefit from violating the bond of trust that underlies
the organ retrieval and transplantation process.
Moral validity of the actions taken by the intensive care
unit team
The following points are crucial for the ICU team.
– The team should act as if Maastricht type III
donation did not exist. This attitude is a fabrication
but constitutes a valuable firewall against ethical
violations. The result is scrupulous adherence by the
team to the separation between two different
temporalities, namely, the dying process as it is
allowed to unfold and the procedures performed to
enable postmortem organ retrieval.
– The team should be acutely aware of the difference
between the death of the patient, in the biological
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irreversible (as reflected by the entry on the death
certificate indicating that death is permanent), and
the dying process, during which the organs and
body components stop functioning over a variable
period and which continues to contribute to the
meaning that will be given retrospectively to the
patient’s life. The gap between these two concepts is
the space in which collection of viable organs from
the body of a dead person can occur.
Which patients with withdrawal decisions may be
candidates for organ donation after their death?
Organ donation may be considered if the following cri-
teria are met:
– The treatment-withdrawal decision was made
independently from any considerations about the
potential for subsequent organ donation, and
– Death occurred immediately after treatment
withdrawal.
Ideally, these patients should be defined by consensus
among all the learned societies involved (SRLF, SFAR,
and SFMU in France). Until such a consensus is
achieved, the SRLF suggests considering potential organ
donation after death in patients with head injuries,
stroke, or anoxic brain injury with coma whose death
seems unavoidable in the short term but who neverthe-
less do not progress to brain death.
For the moment, other patients with treatment-
withdrawal decisions and the small number of patients
who ask for treatment withdrawal are not considered to
be potential donors. Indeed, in such situations the ap-
proach would have to be highly specific; in particular,
any opinions expressed spontaneously by the patients
would have to be taken into account. Consequently, the
SRLF has decided not to take position on these situa-
tions for the time being.
Importance of publicity and the national debate
At present, donors usually envision organ retrieval after a
fatal accident. In this scenario, an unexpected event occurs,
putting an end to a life during which the individual may
have made decisions, such as carrying an organ donor card.
Efforts are needed to raise awareness in the general public
about the possibility of organ retrieval after death due to a
devastating disease for which there is no reasonable hope
for improvement but which may last for some time.
An information campaign is needed before the imple-
mentation of Maastricht type III donation to ensure that
appropriate information is available to all those involved:
the scenario must be accepted by the donors, the health-
care teams, and the recipients. A survey would probablybe useful to identify any possible ethical stumbling blocks
before implementing Maastricht type III donation.
The debate about explicit or presumptive consent [5],
in both cardiocirculatory death and brain death, requires
extensive and repeated information of the general public
about the resumption of non-heart-beating donation. In-
deed, most people are probably not adequately informed
and, consequently, cannot refuse or accept to be donors
with full knowledge of what is involved. It is worth
pointing out that implied consent does not refer specif-
ically to brain death or cardiocirculatory death but to
organ donation after death. The debate should probably
take place at the level of the population, which, in a
democracy, should be in charge of these fundamental
issues that deal with the therapeutic relationship, the
role for medicine, and the status of the individual as a
human being. The introduction of Maastricht type III
donation provides an opportunity for taking the debate
beyond the healthcare community and for ensuring
transparency of all transplantation activities in general.
There is an opening for organizing an exhaustive infor-
mation campaign with all the learned societies involved,
the authorities responsible for regulating transplantation
activities, organ retrieval and transplantation networks,
patients on transplantation lists, healthcare professionals
involved with transplantation, legislators, and the general
public, to clarify issues raised by organ retrieval and the
conduct of procedures for organ retrieval, including the
legal, technical, and moral requirements.
Transparency at all the steps of the process would
have to be ensured via sufficient media attention. A rul-
ing from the national advisory ethics committee (CCNE)
would be helpful.Methods
Treatment withdrawal must comply with French law and
with SRLF recommendations
ICU patients in whom death is deemed unavoidable
should receive palliative care during the treatment-
withdrawal process, in compliance with the Léonetti law
and under the conditions described in SRLF recommen-
dations [6]. These requirements ensure that the patient
receives high-quality end-of-life management. The main
points of the Léonetti law are as follows: unreasonable
obstinacy is proscribed; the patient’s wishes should be
taken into account, directly or indirectly; a collegial dis-
cussion must be held before the decision, which is made
by the physician in charge of the patient; palliative care
must be provided; and the entire procedure must be
recorded (in a way that enables traceability) in the med-
ical chart. The advice of an external consultant must be
obtained to ensure the legitimacy of the procedure, in
compliance with the law. The spirit of the law resides in
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the dying process.When talking with families, information about treatment
withdrawal should be clearly separated from information
about organ retrieval
As stated in the introduction, this principle is crucial to en-
sure that the intensivist can make a treatment-withdrawal
decision in a manner that is completely independent from
potential Maastricht type III donation.
Supplying information about treatment withdrawal is
among the intensivist’s normal duties
Information given to the family about the severity of the
patient’s condition and about treatment-withdrawal deci-
sions must be separated from the information about poten-
tial organ donation. The SRLF recommends following an
information sequence similar to that suggested for stroke
patients, as well as the very early delivery of information, at
admission of the patient to the ICU: (a) the family is
informed about the severity of the situation, and (b) expla-
nations are given about the strong likelihood of treatment
withdrawal depending on the patient’s clinical condition
and under the usual conditions (collegial discussion, family
conference, advice from a consultant, and detailed descrip-
tion of the process in the patient’s medical record).
Nevertheless, there are two situations in which the
issue of separating the treatment-withdrawal decision
from potential organ donation is not really relevant: (a)
availability of a document (e.g., an organ donor card) in
which the patient indicates his or her desire to be an
organ donor (at present, this type of document seems
applicable only in the event of brain death, but its rele-
vance may be extended subsequently to Maastricht type
III donation); (b) and spontaneous disclosure by the
family, during or just after the family conference about
treatment withdrawal, that the patient previously
expressed a desire to be an organ donor. However, under
no circumstances does this form of consent detract from
the duty to first inform patients about all organ retrieval
modalities, including Maastricht type III.
Here, the intensivist informs the family that treatment
withdrawal is expected to be followed by the death of
the patient. There is no reason to act differently in situa-
tions where organ donation may be considered than in
the general situation described in the Léonetti law and
SRLF recommendations, before the emergence of the
Maastricht type III issue. As always, the procedure must
be followed scrupulously; in particular, obtaining the ad-
vice of an external consultant contributes to the legitim-
acy of the treatment-withdrawal decision, which must be
made independently from any considerations about po-
tential organ donation.Who should inform the family that organ donation is a
possibility?
This point of the procedure is particularly sensitive. The
knowledge that treatments will be withdrawn generates
profound emotional distress in the family members. In-
dicating that organs may be collected is probably an ag-
gravating factor (except when the family spontaneously
considers this possibility or accepts immediately when
the issue is raised). The respect due to the dying person
and the duty to provide care to the family, together with
the requirement that treatment-withdrawal decisions be
made independently from organ retrieval decisions, pro-
vide both arguments for and arguments against each of
the two available options: to have the issue of organ do-
nation raised initially by the healthcare team or by the
transplant coordinator team. In both situations, the
healthcare team must be closely involved in the inter-
views and in the procedure.
Having the healthcare team raise the issue of organ
donation ensures continuity of the relationship with the
family and facilitates the intervention of the transplant
coordinator team, which occurs immediately afterward,
particularly when the family spontaneously brings up the
possibility of organ donation. A potential disadvantage,
however, is that the family may become unsure or even
suspicious about the legitimacy of the treatment-
withdrawal decision. On the other hand, in theory, hav-
ing the issue raised by the transplant coordinator team
in the presence of the healthcare team may underline
the independence of the treatment-withdrawal decision
from a desire to enable organ retrieval but also may raise
questions in the minds of the family members.
The SRLF has not definitively stated that one or the
other of these two possibilities is best. Both possibilities
should be considered on a case-by-case basis. In every
case, when the family is unprepared and has not
requested organ donation, the possibility of Maastricht
type III donation should be raised in a sensitive manner
that will avoid a rejection response.
The timing of the investigations needed to determine
whether organ donation is contraindicated is a difficult
issue: should the investigations be done before the pa-
tient dies and before the family is informed or only after
consent of the family is obtained? Is it logical and cost-
effective to perform these investigations without know-
ing whether the families will consent to organ donation?
In theory, there are two available options.
– A reasonable advantage of performing the
investigations (jointly with the transplant
coordinator team) before informing the family is
protection of the family from a trying phase of
uncertainty. The results of liver and kidney
ultrasonography and viral serologies indicate
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dies. This sequence has the theoretical advantage of
not subjecting the family to the double ordeal of
first discussing potential organ donation then
learning that donation is not feasible. Testing for the
HIV without consent from the family is a drawback,
however; in addition to the absence of consent,
which is required for this test, a positive result may
generate distress of greater magnitude than that
whose avoidance was intended. The physician must
either inform the family of the positive HIV result,
shown by a test that was performed without consent
and unrelated to patient management (but that was
done under the hypothesis of organ retrieval, which
contradicts the principle that underlies our thinking)
or fail to disclose the result, as if the patient had
refused disclosure, except that the wishes of the
patient in this regard are unknown.
– Performing the investigations only after telling the
family about the possibility of organ donation has
the advantage, should consent to donation be given,
of obtaining permission from the family to collect
samples and implies that the results will be
communicated to the family, including those of the
HIV tests. These results may generate distress or
disappointment, thereby jeopardizing the
achievement of sufficient serenity to initiate the
grieving process under favorable conditions.
Nevertheless, given the potential disadvantages of
the other option, full information of the family
seems to comply best with both the legal and the
ethical requirements that govern organ donation.
A ruling from the national advisory ethics committee
(CCNE) would probably make a major contribution to
this issue.
Depending on the option that was chosen, the health-
care team or the transplant coordinator team in the
presence of the healthcare team will perform the
following.
(i) Inform the family that organ donation is being
considered to benefit patients who are on transplant
waiting lists. If the patient expressed the wish to be
a donor or the family spontaneously considered this
possibility, instead of information that organ
donation may occur, the family should receive
information on donation modalities, as indicated
below.
(ii)Before extubating the patient, obtain the explicit
consent of the family to organ retrieval. Again, the
modalities of this information should be adapted
depending on the wishes expressed earlier by the
patient or family.The approach advocated by the SRLF is not different
from the good practice rules to be followed when col-
lecting organs from brain-dead patients, as outlined
below.
– Any wishes expressed explicitly by an adult patient
(donor card, which can be likened to an advance
directive for multiorgan retrieval; and verification of
the donation refusal registry) should be honored. In
this situation, collecting organs honors the patient’s
right to autonomy. The relationship with the patient
is not severed: instead, organ retrieval continues the
therapeutic relationship by honoring the wishes the
patient expressed as an autonomous individual. The
technical procedure, far from inducing
instrumentalization, serves the patient by respecting
a choice he or she made before dying. In the setting
of Maastricht type III donation, an important issue
is whether consent given at a time the individual is
healthy is applicable to the end of life. Wishes
expressed previously by the patient are not
sufficient, as the subsequent experience of a serious
illness can profoundly modify the patient’s value
system, leading to a change in the way he or she
envisions the end of life. Far from resulting in a
static construction, thinking evolves continuously in
response to the life experiences it builds on.
If the patient did not express any wishes about organ
donation before dying, and if the family did not raise the
issue spontaneously, a family conference is in order. The
rationale for obtaining informed consent from the family
to organ retrieval and donation is that the family does
not act based on their own wishes but instead based on
what the dying patient would say if he or she were able
to communicate. In this setting, every effort should be
made to honor the patient’s wishes, if any were
expressed clearly, which amounts to obtaining explicit
consent.
(iii) Inform the family of the organ retrieval modalities
and of the attendant requirements, particularly
regarding the location where death will occur. The
best location may be the operating room, for
reasons related both to technical constraints and to
the geographic distance between the ICU and the
operating room. (see section below: where should
the patient be extubated?)
(iv)Caution the family that the organ retrieval
procedure may fail if the time from extubation to
cardiocirculatory arrest is too long, which does not
preclude the donation of corneas.
(v)Indicate to the family that the healthcare team is
available for information about the necessary
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their consent at any time.
Treatment withdrawal modalities
Terminal extubation or terminal weaning?
The possibility of Maastricht type III donation should
not lead to standardization of practices across ICUs,
as the approach and sensitivity of each team are
unique.
Although most teams perform extubation after a phase
of preparation, the important point here is that the
introduction of Maastricht type III donation should not
affect the treatment-withdrawal procedures usually fol-
lowed in each unit and, above all, that regardless of the
method used, the tube is removed by the physician in
charge of the patient.
Sedation
Sedation objectives and practices should be identical to
those used in patients for whom organ donation is not
being considered. If the situation requires sedation, SRLF
recommendations should be followed: lethal injections
are prohibited but medications known to exert a double
effect can be used.
Where should the patient be extubated?
Extubation in the operating room Advantage: the op-
erating room is the best location for optimizing organ
retrieval conditions.
Disadvantage: the high-technology and ultra-medicalized
nature of the operating room has connotations of unfeel-
ingness that are in complete contradiction with attempts to
introduce a culture of palliative care in ICUs.
Extubation in the intensive care unit Advantage: it is
symbolically important to adhere strictly to usual prac-
tice and to deliver continuous care to the families.
Disadvantage: after death occurs, the patient’s body
must be wheeled rapidly through the hallways to the op-
erating room, creating an atmosphere of urgency that is
not conducive to the serenity desirable under these cir-
cumstances. Extubation in the ICU may per se contrib-
ute to the failure of organ retrieval, thereby jeopardizing
the reciprocal commitments made by the healthcare
team to the family and by the family to the last wishes of
the patient.
When extubation is performed in the operating room,
the physician in charge of the patient accompanies the
patient to the operating room and removes the tube. As
with family information about possible organ donation,
each situation should lead to an appropriate individual
decision that strikes the best compromise between, on
the one hand, respect of the patient and expectations ofthe family and, on the other, optimization of organ qual-
ity. When the patient expressed the wish to be an organ
donor or the family spontaneously suggested organ do-
nation, the focus is on respecting this altruistic attitude
and, therefore, on optimizing the conditions of organ
donation. On the opposite, exacerbated distress among
family members and a desire to proceed exactly as usual
when a patient dies after treatment withdrawal may
prompt a decision to perform extubation in the ICU.
Clearly, determining which decision is best requires
close involvement of the family.
Thus, each center accredited by French organ trans-
plantation authorities could be allowed to determine,
in tight collaboration with the close relatives, which
modalities should be given preference, depending on
the relatives’ opinion and on favorable or unfavorable
technical and architectural factors (distance from the
ICU to the operating room). It is worth pointing out
that some teams [7] always perform extubation in the
ICU.
Providing continuous care to the family
Providing care to the family [8] is mandatory, not only
to comply with the law, but also as part of the duty to al-
leviate the distress of people dealing with two devastat-
ing events:
a) loss of hope that the patient may survive, when
treatment withdrawal is announced; and
b) information that organs may be collected and
donated.
The place where the patient dies is important. Patient
care—in the absence of organ retrieval—is usually pro-
vided in the ICU until death occurs, in the presence of the
healthcare team (physicians and other healthcare profes-
sionals) and close relatives. The disadvantages of the oper-
ating room from a human standpoint have been described
earlier. Nevertheless, organ retrieval results in constraints
that have been described to, and accepted by, the family.
This previous information step is crucial to remain con-
sistent with the spirit of the Léonetti law, which seeks
increased humanity and decreased medicalization of
death.
The intensivist certifies death by cardiocirculatory arrest
When the physician certifies death, he or she observes a
state of the body, determines its cause, and predicts that
this state is permanent. Although in the current state of
the art, medicine can determine a probability that death
is irreversible, it is the society in which the physician
practices that equates this probability with a certainty.
The diagnosis of brain death rests on a detailed de-
scription of well-recognized clinical criteria and findings
Graftieaux et al. Annals of Intensive Care 2012, 2:23 Page 7 of 9
http://www.annalsofintensivecare.com/content/2/1/23from investigations. In contrast, the diagnosis of death
by cardiocirculatory arrest continues to raise major
issues. Thus, laws vary across countries regarding the
time from circulatory arrest to signature of the death
certificate: for Maastricht type III patients, 2 min must
be allowed to elapse in Pennsylvania, 5 min in Canada
and France, 10 min in other states of the United States
and the United Kingdom, and 20 min in Sweden.
The key point is the irreversible nature of death. The
SRLF advocates adherence to the recommendations
issued by the Institute of Medicine and Canadian Coun-
cil for Donation and Transplantation [9]: to certify that
irreversible death has occurred, the physician must wait
5 min after the start of cardiocirculatory arrest, without
any attempts at resuscitation, to confirm beyond all
doubt that spontaneous resumption of cardiac function
capable of restoring circulation will not occur. Auto-
resuscitation has never been reported to occur after
more than 65 s of circulatory arrest: after this time (and
even more so after 5 min), the cessation of circulatory
and respiratory function is permanent (“will not return”)
and then inevitably and rapidly becomes irreversible
(“cannot return”).
Organ retrieval rules for Maastricht type III donation
The dead donor rule
Adhesion to the dead donor rule [10] implies that the
dying patient (who is still alive) is not instrumentalized:
cardiopulmonary bypass cannot be started as long as the
patient is alive. The SRLF strongly believes that cannula-
tion (if required) cannot be considered until death is cer-
tified, which removes all possibility of transgression at
this stage of the procedure. This restriction may de-
crease the number of transplants. Organ retrieval from a
patient who has died within this ethical and regulatory
framework is neither a profanation nor a transgression,
as the technical procedures performed on the dead body
are designed only to preserve the organs intended for
transplantation.
The ability to predict the time to death by circulatory
arrest after the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatments
is crucial. Indeed, this time determines the risk of organ
deterioration, on which depends the feasibility of collect-
ing organs for transplantation. This concern about trans-
plant quality before the death of the patient clearly
reflects the ambivalence of the medical viewpoint and
the risk of treating the patient as an object before death
occurs, as discussed above.
Organ retrieval requires a duration of warm ischemia
(systolic blood pressure< 50 mmHg) no greater than 90
min, or perhaps even 60 min. The temptation may arise
to shorten the warm ischemia time with the goal of pre-
serving organ function should cardiac arrest fail to occur
promptly after extubation. To achieve this goal, insteadof allowing death to occur naturally, actions would have
to be taken to hasten death, which would very probably
affect the grieving process in the family members.
Therefore, the SRLF considers that hastening death is
unethical, because palliative care would then no longer
be the priority, and should not be performed.
Destination of the body after organ retrieval
After organ retrieval, the destination of the body is, in
principle, the same as after other circumstances of organ
collection (for instance after brain death).
Provisional accreditation for organ retrieval in pioneer
centers initially
It seems necessary that accreditation for Maastricht type
III organ retrieval be provisional initially. Accreditation
could occur as a temporary authorization procedure, as
was the case for Maastricht types I and II organ
retrieval.
Need for an evaluation by French transplantation
authorities (agence de la Biomédecine, ABM)
The SRLF advocates having the transplant coordinator
be the guarantor of application of good practice
guidelines, in keeping with some of the proposals by
the ABM. However, a legitimate concern is whether
this approach might have a risk of conflicts of inter-
est. A more relevant course of action might be to ob-
tain an independent evaluation by the ABM of both
transplantation procedures and the indications of
organ donation.
Management of critical situations
Failure of organ retrieval
Failure of organ retrieval occurs when the time from
extubation to circulatory arrest is too long to allow the
collection of viable organs. That this situation may arise
should be discussed with the family before the proced-
ure, as indicated above.
Conflict of interest between the family and the healthcare
team
There is a risk that the family might suspect the health-
care team of deciding to withdraw life-sustaining treat-
ments with the goal of enabling organ retrieval. Therefore,
as pointed out above, the procedure for treatment with-
drawal must be followed scrupulously.
Moral difficulties generated by the introduction of
Maastricht type III donation
Although latent concern among family members about
possible instrumentalization can never be completely
eliminated, the healthcare team must be absolutely con-
vinced that instrumentalization does not occur. To this
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ethical appropriateness of its actions by answering the
following questions.
1) Was the attention given to the vital interests of the
potential donor free from any considerations about
possible organ retrieval?
2) Was care to the donor viewed as the finality of care,
as opposed to a means, at the initial phase of his or
her management?
3) Has the possibility of care and procedures being
performed to improve the organ supply been
convincingly eliminated?
4) Was there, at any time, a “strategic” use of futile
care aimed at improving the likelihood of successful
organ retrieval?
Scrupulously applying the intangible principles set
forth above is paramount in a setting where the ICU
team may feel that the final goal has changed: instead of
acting only for the patient, actions directed toward an-
other target may be taken, not subsequently, but at the
same time. Avoiding such confusion is among the main
goals of the principles set forth in this document.
The vulnerable patient
Patients who seem to have no family or close friends
raise difficult problems. In this situation, applying the
implicit consent principle advocated by French law but
rejected in the present document raises obvious moral
concerns. Involvement of a third party (e.g., a guardian-
ship judge, as for the protection of vulnerable adults)
might deserve consideration. Here also, a ruling by the
national advisory ethics committee (CCNE) would be
helpful.
Conflicts of duty
Two major sources of ethical tension may arise in units
authorized to manage potential Maastricht type III
donors. One may result from a feeling of frustration due
to the low organ retrieval rate when recommendations
similar to those put forth in this document are applied.
In this case, a utilitarian perspective may seem to hold
appeal as a means of increasing the rate of successful
organ retrieval, which may lead to premature withdrawal
of active treatments or, on the contrary, to the “strategic”
use of futile treatments until the technical conditions for
organ retrieval are met. The other source of tension is
related to the possible perception among some of the
physicians or other healthcare professionals that, despite
all the precautions described above, they contributed to
what they perceive as a transgression. Clearly, these po-
tential tensions will have to be monitored and evaluated.
Thus, ICUs participating in the pilot phase of MaastrichtIII donation should be audited routinely, not only to
evaluate the procedures but also to analyze the experi-
ence of all those involved in the process, namely, the
ICU team (physicians and nurses), the donor transplant
coordinator team, and the families of Maastricht type III
donors. These audits will have to be conducted by an in-
dependent agency to ensure that the responses of the
interviewees are not biased.
This evaluation phase will be crucial to ensure that the
procedure is conducted properly, to adjust practices, to
review recommendations, and to improve the experience
of all those involved.
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